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Tort Law--Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture: Duty of
Mall Owners to Take Measures to Protect Invitees from
Criminal Acts
In a time of rising crime rates, courts are often presented with the difficult
task of drawing the line between the business owner's duty to provide security
for his patrons and the customer's obligation to accept the risks associated with
venturing into public places. In Foster . Winston-Salem Joint Venture,I the
North Carolina Supreme Court faced this task and held that the owner of a
shopping mall had a duty to provide security measures to protect its customers
from criminal assaults in the mall parking lot if the criminal assaults were
reasonably foreseeable and could have been prevented by the exercise of rea-
sonable care.2 This appears to be the first time that the court has found explic-
itly that a business invitor has the duty to protect his patrons from the
foreseeable criminal conduct of a third party.
3
Defendant, Winston-Salem Joint Venture, is a general partnership that
owns Hanes Shopping Mall in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. On Decem-
ber 20, 1976, plaintiff, Irene B. Foster, drove to the mall to do some Christmas
shopping. After making some purchases, Ms. Foster returned to her car at
approximately 4:30 p.m., while it was still light.4 As Ms. Foster was placing
her packages in her car, two unidentified males suddenly appeared, violently
pushed Ms. Foster into her car, then grabbed her by her feet and pulled her
out of the car onto the pavement where she was kicked, beaten and robbed of
$145.00.5
In the ensuing action against the mall owner, Ms. Foster alleged that the
defendants negligently represented that the parking lot was in a reasonably
safe condition and free from dangers;6 that they negligently failed to warn
plaintiff of the risk of harm from criminal assaults although they had knowl-
edge of prior criminal incidents;7 that they negligently failed to provide ade-
1. 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981)..
2. Id. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
3. Cf. Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666,231 S.E.2d 678 (1977); Aaser v. City of
Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965). Both of these cases addressed a landowner's duty
to protect his invitees from injury by third parties; neither case, however, involved intentional
criminal conduct. In Manganello, plaintiff, a patron at defendant's lake, was injured by the
"rough or boisterous" horseplay of other swimmers. 291 N.C. at 671, 231 S.E.2d at 681. InAaser,
plaintiff, a paying spectator at an ice hockey game, was injured when she was struck by a puck
that a group of young boys were slapping back and forth in a corridor of the arena. 265 N.C. at
495, 144 S.E.2d at 612.
4. Record at 31-32, Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 50 N.C. App. 516, 274 S.E.2d
265, afld in part, rev'd in part, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
5. Id. at 32-36.
6. In his deposition, the manager of the mall indicated that prior to the attack, he had told a
staff writer for the local newspaper that security had been "beefed up," id. at 24, but he could
"not recall any specifics about how [he] increased the security." Id. at 26.
7. The record indicated that there were 31 reported criminal incidents at the mall in the year
prior to Ms. Foster's assault. Id. at 36-38. Although larceny of property was the more common
crime, six or seven physical assaults had been reported. Id.
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quate security protection for mall patrons;8 and that these negligent acts were
the proximate cause of her injuries.9 The trial court granted defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.10 Plaintiff then prose-
cuted an appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals found that the pleadings stated a cause of action,
but nevertheless, affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for de-
fendant. 12 In finding that summary judgment was properly granted, the court
determined that the record presented insufficient evidence that the defendant
had either actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a dangerous
condition in the parking lot.13
On appeal,' 4 the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeals' finding that plaintiff had stated a proper claim for relief but reversed
the affirmance of summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court
for a trial on the merits.15 Justice Copeland, writing for the court, found that
[i]f an invitee ... alleges in a complaint that he or she was on
the premises of a store owner, during business hours for the purpose
of transacting business thereon, and that while he or she was on the
premises injuries were sustained from the criminal acts of a third per-
son, which acts were reasonably foreseeable by the store owner, and
which could have been prevented by the exercise of ordinary care,
then the plaintiff has set forth a cause of action in negligence which,
8. From the time the mall opened until Ms. Foster's assault, the usual security was a single
guard patrolling the parking lot. Id. at 18-20. The lot was also equipped with a series of mercury
vapor lights. Id. at 19. At least one patron had complained to the manager that the lighting
intensity was inadequate and less than that provided at another mall in the Winston-Salem area.
Id. at 39.
9. Brief for Appellant at 4, Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 50 N.C. App. 516, 274
S.E.2d 265, afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
10. 50 N.C. App. at 517, 274 S.E.2d at 266. The trial judge dismissed the action under
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court of appeals found this to be error because defendant had not
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This error was
harmless, however, in light of the court's finding that the trial judge correctly granted summaryjudgment for the defendant. Id.
11. Noting the general rule "that the criminal acts of third parties are entirely unforeseeable"
the court nonetheless found that "such [a rule], .. when applied to. .. a shopping center setting
where large amounts of money and merchandise are exchanged and numerous people with no
apparent purpose in being at the shopping center. . . loiter about, is fallacious." 50 N.C. App. at
517, 274 S.E.2d at 266-67. Consequently, the court found "that it is entirely consistent with the
mainstream of North Carolina law to hold landowners responsible for protecting their business
invitees from the foreseeable criminal action of third parties." Id.
12. Id. at 519, 274 S.E.2d at 267.
13. Id. While acknowledging that "at first blush" the record of prior criminal acts might
warrant the conclusion that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of foreseeable criminal
activity, the court was not willing to let the factual issue of foreseeability go to the jury. Rather, it
found that neither "the numerous petty larcenies in the 76-acre parking lot.. . [nor the] six or
seven assaults in such a large and heavily trafficked area gave defendants knowledge of a danger-
ous condition." Id. In contrast, Judge Wells in dissent found the evidence sufficient to establish
the element of foreseeability of risk of harm from criminal conduct, and would have allowed the
case to go to the jury. Id. at 520, 274 S.E.2d at 267-68 (Wells, J., dissenting).
14. Plaintiff appealed the court of appeals' decision pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30(2)
(1981) which provides, in pertinent part, for appeals of right "from any decision of the Court of
Appeals rendered in a case... (2) In which there is a dissent."
15. Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
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if proved, would entitle that plaintiff to recover damages from the
store owner.
16
Having determined as a matter of law that the duty to exercise ordinary
care existed, 17 the court turned to the question of whether the criminal acts of
these third persons were foreseeable and, if so, whether the defendant exer-
cised reasonable care under the circumstances to fulfill its duty.18 In contrast
to the court of appeals, the supreme court found that plaintiff's evidence raised
sufficient issues of fact for jury determination. On the issue of foreseeability,
the court could not "hold as a matter of law that the thirty-one criminal inci-
dents reported as occurring on the shopping mall premises within the year
preceding the assault on plaintiff were insufficient to charge defendants with
knowledge that such injuries were likely to occur." 19 The supreme court also
found "that a jury could reasonably find that by providing only one guard to
patrol the large parking area during the busy shopping period five days before
Christmas, defendants breached their duty to exercise reasonable care to
maintain the. . . premises in such a manner that they might be used safely by
the customers invited thereon." 20
Dissenting, Justice Carlton emphasized that the imposition of this duty
should be a question of fairness, rather than of foreseeability. On the issue of
fairness, one "should take into account the relationship of the parties, the na-
16. Id. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39. In reaching this holding, the court relied heavily on the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is
subject in liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a
purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable
care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to
protect them against it.
Comment f:
Duty topolicepremses. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor's safety,
he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know
that the acts of the third person are occgrring, or are about to occur. He may, however,
know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct
on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the
visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual.
If the place or character of his business, or his past experience is such that he should
reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either
generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against
it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable
protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 & comment f (1965).
17. Duty is a question of law for the court to determine. See, e.g., McNair v. Boyette, 282
N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972); Ashe v. Acme Builders, Inc., 267 N.C. 384, 148 S.E.2d 244 (1966);
Redding v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 9 N.C. App. 406, 176 S.E.2d 383 (1970).
18. Once the duty is found to exist, it is a question of fact for the jury whether the defendant
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances to fulfill that duty. See, e.g., Kekelis v. Whitin
Mach. Works, 273 N.C. 439, 160 S.E.2d 320 (1968); Lassiter v. Williams, 272 N.C. 473, 158 S.E.2d
593 (1968); Brewer v. Majors, 48 N.C. App. 202, 268 S.E.2d 229 (1980).
19. 303 N.C. at 642, 281 S.E.2d at 40.
20. Id. at 643, 281 S.E.2d at 40-41.
[Vol. 601128
MALL 0 WNER'S DUTY TO PROTECT
ture of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution."21 The ulti-
mate test of fairness is whether "a man [can] ascertain in advance of a jury's
verdict whether the duty is his and whether he has performed it."22 Carlton
found a duty predicated merely on foreseeability too vague and uncertain, and
expressed the fear that the duty was of "potentially limitless scope."
23
The vigorous dissent of Justice Carlton in Foster highlights the difficult
issues presented in this area of tort law. Generally, courts have been hesitant
to find a duty to protect another against the intentional criminal acts of third
parties. Such acts usually cannot be anticipated, and ordinarily one has the
right to assume that others will obey the law. In other words, criminal acts are
usually unforeseeable, and one does not have the duty to protect against an
unforeseeable risk of harm.
Courts have recognized, however, that under special circumstances, one
has the duty to anticipate dangers and take precautions for the protection of
another. This duty typically arises in situations in which one stands in a spe-
cial relationship to another and the other may reasonably be expected to be-
lieve that such protection is forthcoming. Thus, the common carrier,24 the
innkeeper, 25 the employer 26 and the public utility27 all have a general duty to
take active measures to see that certain individuals are protected from an un-
reasonable risk of harm.
Yet even in those special relationships in which one has a duty to take
precautions for the protection of another, an intervening criminal act is often
found to supersede any initial negligence and terminate defendant's liability.
28
The defendant's initial negligence is seen as the remote cause of the injury; his
21. Id. at 644, 281 S.E.2d at 41 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 644, 281 S.E.2d at 41-42 (Carlton, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldberg v. Housing
Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 589, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962)).
23. 303 N.C. at 643, 281 S.E.2d at 41 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Mann v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 283 N.C. 734, 743, 198 S.E.2d 558, 565
(1973) ("[A] carrier owes to the passengers whom it undertakes to transport 'the highest degree of
care for their safety so far as is consistent with the practical operations and conduct of its busi-
ness.'") (quoting White v. Chappell, 219 N.C. 652, 659, 14 S.E.2d 843, 847 (1941)).
25. See, e.g, Rappaport v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 383, 250 S.E.2d 245, 247
(1979) ("[A]n innkeeper is not an insurer of the personal safety of his guests but is required to
.exercise due care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn his guests of any
hidden peril.' ") (quoting Barnes v. Hotel O'Henry Corp., 229 N.C. 730, 731, 51 S.E.2d 180, 181
(1949)).
26. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Blackburn, 47 N.C. App. 144, 148, 266 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1980) (An
employer's "duty is to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition
and to give warning or notice of hidden perils or unsafe conditions insofar as they can be ascer-
tained by reasonable inspection and supervision.").
27. See, e.g., Graham v. North Carolina Butane Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 685, 58 S.E.2d 757,
761-62 (1950) ('Where a gas company... becomes aware that.. . gas is escaping from the gas
fixtures on the premises into the building, it becomes the duty of the gas company to shut off the
gas supply until the further escape of gas from the fixture can be prevented, even though the
fixtures do not belong to the company and are not in its charge or custody.").
28. See, e.g., Ward v. Southern Ry., 206 N.C. 530, 532, 174 S.E. 443, 444 (1934) (employee
killed by coal thieves; criminal act of third party broke "causal chain between the original negli-
gence and the accident"); Chancey v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 174 N.C. 351, 354, 93 S.E. 834, 836 (1917)
(passenger robbed and assaulted on overcrowded and poorly lit train; "there was no causal con-
nection between the supposed negligent act of the defendant and the injury which it is alleged
resulted therefrom").
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liability is insulated by the unforeseeable, intervening criminal act.29 If, how-
ever, the defendant could anticipate the intervening criminal act, the criminal
act will not insulate the negligence which created the opportunity for the crim-
inal activity.30
Therefore, the initial inquiry in Foster is whether defendant had a duty to
provide security against criminal attack. If it did have this duty, it would be
for the jury to determine whether reasonable care was exercised in fulfilling
this duty.31 If negligent conduct is found, further inquiry must be made to
determine whether the injury that occurred was a foreseeable result of that
negligence. The question then becomes whether defendant's conduct was the
"proximate cause"32 of the injury.
As a customer of the retail establishments of the mall, Ms. Foster's visit
was for the mutual advantage of both her and defendant mall owners. Conse-
quently, she held the common law status of an invitee.33 Defendant therefore
29. See Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 30, 157 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1967) ("If the
connection between negligence and the injury appears unnatural, unreasonable and improbable in
the light of common experience, the negligence, if deemed a cause of the injury at all, is to be
considered a remote rather than a proximate cause."); Nance v. Parks, 266 N.C. 206, 211, 146
S.E.2d 24, 28 (1966) ("To exculpate a negligent defendant by insulating his negligence, the inter-
vening cause must be one which breaks the connection between defendant's negligence and the
injury alleged in such a manner that it itself becomes the proximate cause of the injury.").
30. See, e.g., Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 268 S.E.2d 855 (1980). In
Wesley the party who attacked plaintiff had committed other Crimes in the bus station and had
been removed from the station "approximately 50 times" by defendant's employees. Id. at 699,
268 S.E.2d at 867. Also, "[p]imps, prostitutes, transvestites, bums, winos, and loiterers. . . were
allowed to linger in the bus station where they frequently pestered defendant's passengers." Id. at
700, 268 S.E.2d at 867. The court of appeals found this evidence "more than sufficient" to show
that a criminal assault upon defendant's passengers was foreseeable. Id. The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts takes a similar approach:
Intentionally Tortious or CriminalActs Done Under Opportunit
Afforded by Actor's Negligence
The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause
of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negligent conduct created a
situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or
crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized
the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or crime.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 (1965) (emphasis added).
31. See note 18 supra.
32. "Proximate cause is that cause which produces the result in continuous sequence and
without which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence
could have foreseen that such a result was probable under all the facts then existing." Kanoy v.
Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 426, 160 S.E.2d 296, 302 (1968). See also Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 234
N.C. 206, 214, 67 S.E.2d 63, 68-69 (1951); Goode v. Harrison, 45 N.C. App. 547, 548-49, 263
S.E.2d 33, 34 (1980).
33. "To constitute one as an invitee there must be some mutuality of interest. Usually an
invitation will be inferred where the reason for the visit is of mutual advantage to the parties. To
be an invitee, the purpose of the visit must be of interest or advantage to the invitor." Briles v.
Briles, 43 N.C. App. 575, 577, 259 S.E.2d 393, 395, cert. denied, 299 N.C. 329, 265 S.E.2d 394
(1980).
North Carolina has not followed the minority of jurisdictions that have abrogated the com-
mon-law classifications of invitee, licensee and trespasser in favor of a general negligence test of
reasonableness under the circumstances. See, e.g., Starr v. Clapp, 40 N.C. App. 142, 143, 252
S.E.2d 220, 221, afld, 298 N.C. 275, 258 S.E.2d 348 (1979) ('The duty owed a person on the
premises of another depends upon whether that person is an invitee, licensee or trespasser."). For
formulations of the minority view, see Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.
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had the duty to provide a reasonably safe place for plaintiff to do that which
was within the scope of her invitation, or to provide warning of hidden dan-
gers discoverable by reasonable inspection.3 4 The theory is that the "invita-
tion" by defendant to enter gives an implied assurance that the premises have
been made safe for their intended use.35
Expressed in these terms, the duty imposed upon business invitors in Fos-
ter is not a radical departure from accepted concepts in invitee-invitor case
law.3 6 The invitor has the duty to "exercise ordinary care to keep his premises
... in a safe condition."37 There is no distinction made in the rule between
danger created by a physical condition on the land and danger created by a
third party's act.38
It is fundamental that the existence of the invitor's duty is judged by the
foreseeability of unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee. 39 Thus, a finding
that "foreseeability is the test in determining the extent of a landowner's duty
to safeguard his business invitees from the criminal acts of third persons"' 40 is
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v.
City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364
A.2d 631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); Mari-
orenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 129 (1975).
34. [An invitor is] under the legal duty to his patrons to exercise ordinary care to keep
his premises, and all parts thereof to which persons lawfully present may go, in a safe
condition for the use for which they are designed and intended, and to give warning of
hidden dangers or unsafe conditions in so far as can be ascertained by reasonable inspec-
tion and supervision.
Revis v. Orr, 234 N.C. 158, 160, 66 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1951). There is no question that the scope of
the owner's duty extends to the parking lot provided for the convenience of the invitees. See
Game v. Charles Stores Co., 268 N.C. 676, 151 S.E.2d 560 (1966); Berger v. Cornwell, 260 N.C.
198, 132 S.E.2d 317 (1963).
35. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 61, at 388-91 (4th ed. 1971).
36. In fact, the court of appeals recognized "that it is entirely consistent with the mainstream
of North Carolina law to hold landowners responsible for protecting their business invitees from
the foreseeable criminal action of third parties." 50 N.C. App. at 518, 274 S.E.2d at 266.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. This is consistent with prior cases in which third persons may have negligently created
dangerous conditions. See, e.g., Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 499, 144 S.E.2d 610, 615
(1965) ("[W]hen the dangerous condition or activity. . . arises from the act of third persons,
whether themselves invitees or not, the owner is not liable for injury resulting unless he knew of its
existence or it had existed long enough for him to have discovered it by the exercise of due dili-
gence and to have removed or warned against it."); Long v. National Food Stores, Inc., 262 N.C.
57, 60, 136 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1964) ("[W]here the unsafe or dangerous condition is created by a
third party ... an invitee proximately injured thereby may not recover, unless he can show that
the unsafe or dangerous condition had remained there for such a length of time that the inviter
[sic] knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, of its existence."); Stafford v.
Food World, Inc., 31 N.C. App. 213, 216, 228 S.E.2d 756, 757, cert. denied, 291 N.C. 324, 230
S.E.2d 677 (1976) ("If the unsafe condition is created by third parties. . . a showing must be
made that it had existed for such length of time that the store proprietor knew or by the exercise of
reasonable care should have known of its existence in time to have removed the danger or given
warning of its presence."); Gaskill v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 6 N.C. App. 690, 693, 171 S.E.2d
95, 97 (1969).
39. Foreseeability is a major variable in the initial judicial determination whether a duty
exists. See W. Prosser, supra note 35, § 33. Foreseeability also plays a crucial role in determining
whether negligent conduct was the cause of plaintifrs injury. See text accompanying notes 77-79
infra.
40. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
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neither novel nor unsupportable in the case law.4 1
There is some concern, however, that foreseeability is an inadequate test
of duty when the cause of injury is intentional criminal conduct. Due to the
pervasive nature of criminal activity in our society, "[e]veryone can foresee the
commission of crime virtually anywhere and at any time."'42 Thus, a duty
predicated on foreseeability might have "potentially limitless scope."43
These fears are in most cases unfounded. Since the general rule is that
criminal activity is unforeseeable, any claim that it was foreseeable will be
subject to strict scrutiny by the court. Therefore, questionable claims should
rarely reach the jury.
Also, foreseeability is tied directly to the "place or character of the busi-
ness, or. . . past experience." 44 These variables are figured into the calculus
to determine whether any duty exists. Foster is illustrative of the use of these
variables. It is recognized that suburban shopping malls attract both shoppers
and those who prey on shoppers. Activity, both legal and illegal, is known to
increase during the holiday season.45 Recognizing the existence of these
problems and the likelihood that they would continue, the Hanes mall owners
represented to the public that they were taking extra security measures.46 The
special nature of mall activity put defendants on notice of the need to antici-
pate and take reasonable precautions against criminal activity.
Actual past occurrences of criminal conduct provide further evidence on
the issue of foreseeability. While the court of appeals found that the thirty-one
reported criminal incidents in the year prior to the assault were insufficient
evidence of foreseeability, the supreme court determined that the matter
should go to the jury. When the jury does hear evidence on foreseeability, it
will be presented with the conceptually difficult issue of determining how
many criminal acts must occur before the unforeseeable becomes foresee-
able.47 Yet when coupled with the special circumstances found in the mall
41. See, e.g., Tyndall v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
42. 303 N.C. at 644, 281 S.E.2d at 41 (Carlton, J., dissenting) (quoting Goldberg v. Housing
Auth., 38 NJ. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)). See also Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d
507, 509 (D.C. 1976):
This court is all too familiar through daily police reports of the high incidence
throughout the entire city of such crimes as mugging, purse-snatching, assault and rob-
bery-a constant hazard to all law-abiding persons who use the streets and public places
of business. But simply because this hazard exists, it does not follow that the common
law of negligence imposes an obligation upon private enterprises to provide armed
guards to insure the safety of persons invited to do business with them.
43. 303 N.C. at 643, 281 S.E.2d at 41 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
44. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, comment f (1965). See note 16 supra.
45. Ms. Foster was assaulted on December 20, 1976. 303 N.C. at 637, 281 S.E.2d at 37.
46. See note 6 supra.
47. The uncertainties inherent in this evaluation led one court to inquire:
[HMow many criminal acts are necessary to invoke the duty to warn and how many are
necessary to impose the duty to hire a private police force? Is the Court to determine the
number, or is the jury to be permitted to speculate upon the appropriate number of
criminal acts to give rise to the duty? Is it not also appropriate to consider the time
element? After a lapse of six months, one year or two years without an incident or a
criminal act, can a merchant disband his private police force?
Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 197 (Tenn. 1975).
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environment, and the general duty of a business invitor,48 it is reasonable to
find that the mall owners were put on sufficient notice to raise a duty to protect
against this type of harm.49
In an effort to limit the scope of the foreseeability test, the dissent would
inquire into both the invitee's and the mall owners' actual or constructive no-
tice of foreseeable risk of harm. Under this view a comparison of the criminal
activity of the parking lot with the crime rate of the surrounding neighborhood
is necessary.50 If the parking lot and the surrounding neighborhood experi-
ence similar criminal activity, "no duty on the part of the owner should arise
because the foreseeability of criminal activity is equally obvious to the owner
or the patron. . . and. . . the patron is simply taking a known and accepted
risk in venturing out."' 5 1 This analysis recognizes the scope of criminal activity
in society, and looks beyond past occurrences to the general risks of venturing
out into a particular location. The underlying rationale seems to be that an
invitee should not expect the business owner to make his premises any safer
than those of the surrounding community. 52
There are at least two flaws in the dissent's approach. First, this analysis
clearly would be inappropriate if used to determine invitor liability for injuries
caused by physical conditions. It would, for example, deny relief to an invitee
who patronizes a business located in a deteriorating section of town. An in-
vitor could claim he had no duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe
condition since the surrounding neighborhood would have put the invitee on
notice that the premises would likely be in disrepair. Such a result is clearly
objectionable. Second, the dissent's approach would be contrary to the public
interest which is served by requiring the private sector to supplement govern-
48. See note 34 supra.
49. Compare Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149, 369 A.2d 38 (1976)
(patron assaulted and raped in parking lot of supermarket; similar occurrences immediately prior
to attack on plaintiff gave rise to duty to provide reasonable security measures to deter foreseeable
criminal acts); and Murphy v. Penn Fruit Co., 274 Pa. Super. 427, 418 A.2d 480 (1980) (patron
assaulted, stabbed in parking lot of grocery store; past criminal acts in vicinity of store created
inference that plaintiffs injury was foreseeable) with Drake v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 377 So.2d
1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (bank customer kidnapped in bank parking lot, robbed and mur-
dered; plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to meet test of foreseeability); McClendon v. Citi-
zens & S. Nat'l Bank, 155 Ga. App. 755, 272 S.E.2d 592 (1980) (bank customer robbed at gunpoint
in parking lot of bank; defendant had no notice of dangerous condition in lot as no robberies had
occurred there previously); O'Brien v. Colonial Village, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 2d 105, 255 N.E.2d 205
(1970) (patron of shopping center assaulted in parking lot; plaintiff failed to allege previous inci-
dents or special circumstances that would charge owners with knowledge of dangers); and Shipes
v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269 S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977) (customer assaulted in
parking lot; plaintiff failed to prove that defendant knew or had reason to know of such attacks).
50. In North Carolina, evidence of crime in the surrounding area is admissible to show con-
structive knowledge of the need for security measures. See Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47
N.C. App. 680, 685, 268 S.E.2d 855, 859 (1980). Contra, Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 197
(Tenn. 1975) ("Conditions in the area are irrelevant.").
51. 303 N.C. at 647, 281 S.E.2d at 43 (Carlton, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). If a
dangerous condition is apparent to both the invitor and invitee, the invitor usually has no duty to
take affirmative action to warn the invitee of the danger. See, e.g., Long v. Methodist Home for
the Aged, Inc., 281 N.C. 137, 187 S.E.2d 718 (1972) (invitee slipped and fell on wet floor that was
the result of the invitee's overstuffing the commode with toilet paper).
52. See 303 N.C. at 647, 281 S.E.2d at 43 (Carlton, J., dissenting) ("What right does a patron
have to demand that the store premises be safer than the general area in which it is situated?").
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mental efforts to fight crime.5 3
Finding that a duty exists does not resolve the issue of whether it is wise
or reasonable to impose it. "Duty" is a term of art expressing a court's evalua-
tion that the creation of a particular legal obligation is determined to be in the
public interest.54 Therefore, any meaningful analysis of Foster requires an
inquiry into the various policies which would be reflected in an imposition of
this duty on mall owners.
To ensure the greatest benefit to society, liability should be limited by a
cost-benefit analysis. This analysis is not alien to the law of torts; it is implicit
in Learned Hand's classic formulation of the factors determining the existence
of the duty,55 and various courts have accepted this analysis.5 6 The public
interest is served only if the costs of imposing the duty are less than or equal to
the benefits received.57 The desired result of the imposition of a duty is to
reduce the overall costs to society of a particular activity. While the various
unknown contingencies involved in these circumstances make a quantitative
cost-benefit analysis impossible, the qualitative aspects of this duty can be
scrutinized.
Cost-benefit analysis requires that the desired economic and social poli-
cies be taken into consideration and assigned their appropriate weight.58
Though not articulated by the supreme court, the public policy rationale im-
plicit in the Foster decision was expressed by the court of appeals when it
53. See notes 58 & 59 infra.
54. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76 (1968)
(" '[D]uty' is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considera-
tions of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.")
(quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 53, at 333 (3d ed. 1964)).
55. "[The owner's duty.., to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three vari-
ables: (1) The probability [of harm]; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if [it occurs]; (3) the
burden of adequate precautions." United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947).
56. See, e.g., Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr.
847, 851-52 (1963):
An affirmative declaration of duty simply amounts to a statement that two parties
stand in such relationship that the law will impose on one a responsibility for the exercise
of care toward the other. Inherent in this simple description are various and sometimes
delicate policy judgments. The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises,
compared with the risks involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the actor
is dealing; the workability of a rule of care, especially in terms of the parties' relative
ability to adopt practical means of preventing injury; the relative ability of the parties to
bear the financial burden of injury and the availability of means by which the loss may
be shifted or spread; the body of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties'
relationship; the prophylactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a public agency
defendant, the extent of its powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations
imposed upon it by budget; and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share with
their fellow citizens--such are the factors which play a role in the determination of duty.
See also Phillips v. Croy, 173 Ind. App. 401, 405, 363 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (1977) ("Mhe quantum
of care exercised must be proportionate to the danger to be avoided and the fatal consequences
involved in its neglect compared to the importance of the right the claimant is seeking to
advance.").
57. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
Yale LJ. 499 (1961); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, I J. Legal Stud. 29, 33-48 (1972).
58. See Bazyler, The Duty to Provide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liability for Fail-
ure to Protect Patrons from Criminal Attack, 21 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 737-54 (1979).
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noted that the very nature of the activity generated by the modem shopping
mall required that general rules of tort liability should be reevaluated.59 The
court thus determined that the special conditions found in the mall setting
which might aid, abet or entice criminal activity require that a particular type
of responsibility be imposed on mall owners.
Other social and economic goals should be noted. Along with affording
plaintiff Foster the opportunity to prove and recover damages,60 the court's
decision requires the private sector to take steps to deter criminal activity. 61
Additionally, the court imposed the duty upon the party best able to prevent
the loss62 and efficiently allocated the costs of deterrent measures among the
members of society.63 While the result will of course lead to greater expense
for all mall patrons, the court implicitly determined that it is more cost effec-
59. 50 N.C. App. at 518, 274 S.E.2d at 266. See note 11 supra. See also Cornpropst v. Sloan,
528 S.W.2d 188, 199 (Tenn. 1975) (Henry, J., dissenting) ("Having thus caused enormous congre-
gations of potential and actual shoppers in relatively compact areas, certain duties devolve upon
the invitors for the benefit and protection of the invitees.").
60. The general purpose of tort law is to compensate an injured party and make him whole
for the injuries he has suffered. W. Prosser, supra note 35, § 2, at 7. However, in these circum-
stances, recovery is not had from the criminal, but from the owner of the premises upon which the
injury occurred. As a consequence, some observers question the propriety of "shifting the financial
loss caused by crime from one innocent victim to another innocent victim." Davis v. Allied Su-
permarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963, 965 (Okla. 1976).
61. In dissent, Justice Carlton questioned the propriety of obligating the mall owner to create
a private police force to patrol its parking area. In his opinion, "the creation of myriad private
Olice forces and the shift of law enforcement duties to the private sector mounts to taking the
lw into one's own hands and ontravenes public policy." 303 N.C. at 645, 281 S.E.2d at 42(Carlton, J., disse ting). These feelings are echoed by the insurance industry, which recom-
mended that its defense attorneys "emphase... that the defendant is not an insurer and that
society has vested in the government the responsibility for protecting the public from criminalattack. The fact that government and law enforcement authorities cannot prevent criminal attacksdoes not justify transferring such responsibility to business proprietors." Fager, Liability of Busi-
ness Proprietors for Criminal Acts of Third Persons, 29 Fed'n Ins. Couns. Q. 29, 33 (1978).
However, "in the fight against crime the police are not expected to do it all; every segment ofsociety has obligations to aid in law enforcement and to minimize the opportunities for crime."
Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted).Courts have recognized this obligation and have not been hesitant to require certain private par-
ties to provide polic protection for another. See, e.g., Dilley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 183 Md.
557,o56, 39 A.2d 469, 471 (a94) ("[C]arrier is required to furnish suficient police force to protect
its passengers from the assaults or violence of other passengers or strangers which might reason-
ably be expected ... ") (quoting Maryland Dredging & Contracting Co. v. Hines, 269 F. 781,
782 (4th Cir. 1920)); Dean v. Hotel Greenwich Corp., 21 Misc. 702, 193 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1959).
62. [O]f all the involved parties, the cost of crime reduction is cheapest to the landowner.
For the criminal, imposing civil liability on him in addition to existing criminal sanctions
does not deter him from committing the crime. Imposing duty on the patron, so that he
must protect and compensate himself, may result in crime reduction, but only at the
expensive cost of the patron staying home. While the patron can prevent crime by not
going out at night, the price of staying home is high not only for him but also for society
in general. As opposed to the transient patron, who has little information about the
crime problem on the landowner's premises and little ability to directly influence it, the
landowner can be much more effective in dealing with the problem. While the patron
holds just one expensive option, staying home, the landowner holds many options, rang-
ing from installation of better lighting, fences, or guard service, to even varying hours of
operation. All of these options should be less expensive and much more effective in
deterring crime than the patron's sole choice of staying home.
Bazyler, supra note 58, at 747-48 (footnotes omitted).
63. The mall owner can distribute the costs of deterrence equitably to all mall patrons
through the pricing mechanism.
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tive for the consuming public to share the costs of security measures than to
allow patrons such as plaintiff Foster to bear their losses individually.
While the imposition of this duty may be cost effective in the factual set-
ting of Foster, unless this duty is further refined and limited to circumstances
similar to a mall setting, the costs of performing the duty may outweigh the
benefits society receives from its imposition.
The court's holding requires that an injured business invitee allege and
prove two elements of the cause of action: (1) "the criminal acts of a third
person. . . were reasonably foreseeable," and (2) these acts "could have been
prevented by the exercise of ordinary care."64 Thus, the parameters of the
duty are the foreseeability of the criminal act and the probability that this act
could have been deterred.
As noted above,65 using foreseeability as a construct in determining the
extent of the business invitor's duty is entirely consistent with fundamental tort
doctrine. Thus, an inquiry into the foreseeability of criminal conduct will pro-
ceed along traditional lines of analysis. The difficulty inherent in the Foster
holding lies with the deterrence and causation issues presented. Deterrence
and causation problems are necessarily intertwined, for plaintiff must allege
and prove that her "injuries were sustained from the criminal acts of a third
person,. . . which [acts] could have been prevented by the exercise of ordi-
nary care." 66 In other words, the issue is whether defendant's failure to pro-
vide security measures was the actual and proximate cause of plaintiffs injury.
This issue presents much conceptual difficulty, creating the potential that lia-
bility will be found in inappropriate circumstances, with a subsequent misallo-
cation of resources.67
Once plaintiff has proved defendant's negligence, she must then prove
that this negligence was the actual68 as well as proximate cause69 of the injury
complained of. The usual test of actual causation is the "but for" test: if
plaintiffs injury would not have occurred but for defendant's negligence, ac-
tual causation exists. 70 Plaintiff need not prove that the defendant absolutely
and beyond a doubt caused her injuries, rather, she must demonstrate that it is
64. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
65. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
66. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
67. Due to plaintiffs difficulties in proving causation, there is some concern that liability will
be automatically imposed if prior criminal acts on or near the premises suffice to give the owner
notice of a foreseeable danger. This concern is expressed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the
North Carolina Merchants Association. The Association believed that in those jurisdictions
where liability has been recognized, "the results appear to be founded more upon strict liability
than traditional notions of negligence." Amicus Curiae Brief (N.C. Merchants Ass'n) at 5, Foster
v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 281 S.E.2d 36 (1981).
68. See, e.g., Battley v. Seaboard Airline Ry., I N.C. App. 384, 161 S.E.2d 750 (1968).
69. See, e.g., Tyndall v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 266 (E.D.N.C. 1969), afl'd, 430 F.2d 1180
(4th Cir. 1970); Meyer v. McCarley & Co., 288 N.C. 62, 215 S.E.2d 583 (1975); Clarke v. Holman,
274 N.C. 425, 163 S.E.2d 783 (1968).
70. See, e.g., Hoyle v. Southern Bell TeL & Tel. Co., 474 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D.N.C. 1979),
afl'd, 631 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1980); Kanoy v. Hinshaw, 273 N.C. 418, 160 S.E.2d 296 (1968);
Barefoot v. Joyner, 270 N.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 543 (1967); Ratliffv. Duke Power Co., 268 N.C. 605,
151 S.E.2d 641 (1966).
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more probable than not that the injuries were caused by defendant's con-
duct.7 1 When other causes have contributed to plaintiffs injury, the court has
indicated that defendant's conduct will not be insulated so long as it "played a
substantial and proximate part in plaintiffs injury."72 Therefore, plaintiff must
present proof that the lack of security played a substantial role in giving her
unknown assailants the motivation and opportunity to assault her. Plaintiff
must also demonstrate that these unknown parties probably would have been
deterred by the presence of security measures. Yet these proofs rest upon the
tenuous assumption that criminals are motivated or deterred by the same fac-
tors which drive noncriminal behavior.
On remand, the jury shall determine the causation issue. The court deter-
mined that the evidence presents an issue upon which reasonable men may
differ.73 The experience in other jurisdictions supports this conclusion. Courts
that have considered the issue have reached various conclusions. Some find
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what precautions will deter
unknown parties from often irrational criminal behavior. As a result, they
find that as a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to prove actual causation. 74
Other courts have relied on these same considerations to find that the conduct
of the third party was the superseding independent cause of plaintiff's inju-
ries.75 In contrast, a minority of courts have determined that "it is not unrea-
sonable to infer that reasonable security measures would have served as a
deterrent and that defendants' failure to take such measure [sic] constituted a
substantial factor in the assault."76
71. W. Prosser, supra note 35, § 41, at 242.
72. Porter v. Pitt, 261 N.C. 482,483, 135 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1964). See, e.g., Henderson v. Powell,
221 N.C. 239, 243, 19 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1942). This test is to be distinguished from the "substantial
factor' test often used when two causes coalesce to cause harm and neither acting alone would
have caused the identical injury. See W. Prosser, supra note 35, § 41, at 239-40; Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 431, 433 (1965).
73. Thus, the court has implicitly determined that the "legal cause" of plaintiffs injury is not
so highly speculative as to take the matter from the jury. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 435(2) (1965) ("The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another
where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears
to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.").
74. See, e.g., Shaner v. Tucson Airport Auth., 117 Ariz. 444, 448, 573 P.2d 518, 522 (1977)
(patron abducted in parking lot of airport; issue of causation "left to sheer speculation");
Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 590, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962) (deliveryman assaulted in
elevator of housing project; court found "exceptional uncertainty with respect to the issue of cau-
sation. This is so because of the extraordinary speculation inherent in the subject of deterrence of
men bent upon criminal ventures. It would be quite a guessing game to determine whether some
unknown thug of unknowable character and mentality would have been deterred if the owner had
furnished some additional policemen.").
75. See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (patron assaulted in shop-
ping center parking lot; defendants did not owe plaintiff duty to guard against third party's crimi-
nal act unless they knew or had reason to know such acts were occurring and would pose
immediate harm to plaintiff; in any event, third party's attack was an efficient, intervening and
unforeseeable cause of the injury); Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976)
(customer's purse snatched in supermarket parking lot; even if defendant were negligent in its
failure to provide adequate lighting and personnel, plaintiffs injuries were caused by independent
intervening criminal acts of third party).
76. Atamian v. Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 146 N.J. Super. 149, 159, 369 A.2d 38, 43 (1976)
(patron assaulted and raped in parking lot of supermarket). See also Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.,
177 NJ. Super. 279, 287, 426 A.2d 521,525 (1981) (patron attacked in supermarket parking lot; "It
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Once the plaintiff has passed the barrier of the "substantial factor" test of
actual causation, the issue of proximate cause presents little difficulty. Fore-
seeability is the test of proximate cause.77 The defendant need not "foresee
the precise injury; the particular consequences it produces; nor the exact man-
ner in which it occurs. All that is required is that defendant 'in the exercise of
. . . reasonable care. . . should have foreseen that some injury.., or.
consequences of a generally injurious nature should have been expected.' "-78
Therefore, defendant's liability cannot go beyond that which was "unusual
and unlikely to happen or. . . was only remotely and slightly probable." 79
The facts of Foster present a strong foreseeability issue for the jury.
While the majority of prior criminal activity involved larceny of property,
there were also a number of serious personal assaults reported in the year prior
to the accident.80 Even if the facts had indicated that a patron's property was
the only interest threatened by defendant's alleged negligence, the fact that a
different interest of the plaintiff was actually injured should not allow an ex-
culpation from liability.81 It is for the jury to determine whether the harm
is a matter of common knowledge that the presence of security guards or similar personnel , .
will have a deterrent effect upon criminal activity."); Slapin v. Los Angeles Int'l Airport, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 484, 135 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1976) (patron of airport parking lot assaulted; plaintiff could not
recover from city for failure to provide adequate security as this is a discretionary decision by city,
yet could recover for failure to provide adequate lighting if this created a foreseeable condition
which allowed assaults to occur); Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(employee of shopping center owned by defendant assaulted in parking lot after work; jury verdict
for plaintiff sustained; reasonableness of defendant's security measures, defendant's actual or con-
structive knowledge of past criminal conduct and defendant's ability to anticipate future criminal
conduct were issues for the jury).
In Foster defendant's mall manager indicated in his deposition that an increase in security
measures would often reduce criminal activity. He stated:
As for robberies and/or larcenies in the parking lot, I would say we probably average
somewhere between one to one and a half larcenies a month .... You might have a
spurt of activity and you react to it and you stop it .... It is correct that when I say we
react to it, that means we increase our security in the parking lot .... When I say you
stop it, I mean that you cut it back. We never have stopped all crime in the parking lot.
What I mean is, that if there is a pattern or something, sometimes you make an arrest
and that will cease that particular activity.
Record at 21-22.
77. See, e.g., Williams v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 403, 250 S.E.2d 255, 258
(1979) ("The test of proximate cause is whether the risk of injury, not necessarily in the precise
form in which it actually occurs, is within the reasonable foresight of the defendant."); McNair v.
Boyette, 282 N.C. 230, 236, 192 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1972) ("Foreseeability of injury is an essential
element of proximate cause."); Clarke v. Homan, 274 N.C. 425, 429, 163 S.E.2d 783, 786 (1968)
("Reasonable foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause .... ).
78. Partin v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 40 N.C. App. 630, 633, 253 S.E.2d 605, 609, cert.
denied, 297 N.C. 611, 257 S.E.2d 219 (1979) (citations omitted) (quoting Hamilton v. McCash, 257
N.C. 611, 618-19, 127 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1962)). Therefore, Justice Carlton's opinion that the mall
owner should be required to foresee criminal activity "only as broad as the type of criminal activ-
ity which had occurred in the past" has no support in the case law. See Foster, 303 N.C. at 646,
281 S.E.2d at 42 (Carlton, J., dissenting). See also note 81 infra.
79. Phelps v. City of Winston-Salem, 272 N.C. 24, 30, 157 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1967).
80. These included attempted armed robbery, various assaults and a kidnapping. Record at
36-38.
81. See W. Prosser, supra note 35, § 43; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281, comment j
(1965) ("mhe fact that the interest to which harm results is a different interest, or a different kind
of interest, from that which was threatened with harm, will not prevent the actor from being
liable, so long as the interest in fact harmed is one entitled to legal protection against negli-
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which in fact occurred was within the scope of the risk created by the mall's
allegedly negligent conduct.
Because of the uncertain nexus between security measures and deterrence,
the Foster court did not articulate a "standard of performance to which the
owner may look for guidance,"82 other than the standard of "ordinary care."8 3
Is this standard so vague that a merchant will know he has breached the duty
only after the jury verdict against him?84 Is this duty applicable to all
merchants or only to those that are similar to a mall in size and mode of
operation? Most small merchants do not have the financial resources to pro-
vide anything but the minimal security measures, such as lighting. A true
cost-benefit analysis might exempt such small businesses from this positive
duty if the cost of performing this duty threatens the very existence of the
business. Yet the court's holding is not so limited, referring only to "a store
owner."85 Much finer distinctions must be drawn if the business owner and
his attorney are to know with certainty the scope of this obligation.
Furthermore, the court required that only "ordinary care" be used in at-
tempting to deter criminal activity. Ordinary care is defined as "such care as
an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circum-
stances to avoid injury."86 In the owner/invitee situation of Foster, ordinary
care is the duty "to keep that portion of his premises designed for use by his
invitees in a reasonably safe condition so as not to expose them unnecessarily
to danger."87
Thus, the business owner is not held to the higher degree of care imposed
on certain other parties to anticipate and protect another from the criminal
acts of third parties.88 No extraordinary efforts are required to fulfill the duty.
Whether ordinary care is sufficient to deter criminal conduct is problematical.
If most criminal conduct is thwarted by only the most sophisticated security
gence."). These authorities were relied on by one court in rejecting "defendant's position. . . that
its knowledge that car thefts were being committed obligated it to protect against cars being stolen
from the Mall's parking lot but did not obligate it to protect against patrons being attacked on the
parking lot." Morgan v. Bucks Assocs., 428 F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
82. Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 590, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962).
83. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
84. This concern is expressed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the North Carolina
Merchants Association. Amicus Curiae Brief (N.C. Merchants Ass'n) at 2, Foster v. Winston-
Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636,281 S.E.2d 36 (1981). See also Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38
NJ. 578, 589, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (1962) ("Fairness ordinarily requires that a man be able to ascer-
tain in advance of a jury's verdict whether the duty is his and whether he has performed it.").
85. 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39.
86. Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 673, 268 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1980) (quoting
Clark v. Roberts, 263 N.C. 336, 343, 139 S.E.2d 593, 597 (1965)).
87. Rappaport v. Days Inn of Am., Inc., 296 N.C. 382, 387, 250 S.E.2d 245,249 (1979) (quot-
ing Wrenn v. Hillcrest Convalescent Home, Inc., 270 N.C. 447, 448, 154 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1967)).
88. Consider the various degrees of care imposed on the common carrier. Mills v. Atlantic
Coast Line Ry., 172 N.C. 266, 267, 90 S.E. 221,221 (1916) ("high degree of care"); Hollingsworth
v. Skelding, 142 N.C. 246, 249, 55 S.E. 212, 213 (1906) ("as far as human care and foresight could
go"); Daniel v. Petersberg R.R., 117 N.C. 592, 602, 23 S.E. 327, 327 (1895) ("the utmost human
skilU and foresight"). See generally Wesley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 680, 691-95,
268 S.E.2d 855, 863-64 (1980); Note, Torts--Negligence--Common Carriers-Degree of Care
Owed Passengers, 17 N.C.L. Rev. 453 (1939).
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measures, ordinary care would prevent few crime-related injuries. If the as-
sault would have occurred even if defendant had exercised ordinary care, de-
fendant's failure to provide ordinary care cannot be the actual or the
proximate cause of the injury.8 9
If the relation between security measures and deterrence is so tenuous, the
imposition of this duty seems unjustified. Costs are exacted from the business
owner on the uncertain assumption that benefits are received. On the other
hand, by requiring the business owner to meet a standard of ordinary care, the
court forces the owner to take certain minimum security measures. More likely
than not these will be relatively inexpensive, highly visible deterrent measures
which do not interfere with the normal conduct of business.90 Though the
evidence is inconclusive, it can reasonably be assumed that various environ-
mental changes would affect criminal activity as well as patrons' fear of
crime.91
In the final analysis, Foster presented a strong set of facts where the court
would have found it difficult to avoid imposing the duty to protect another
from the criminal acts of a third party. Once the duty is imposed, finding
liability stretches the concept of causation to its outer limit. In spite of these
problems, the imposition of the duty may further the important social goal of
reducing crime. In response to the uncertain standard to which they will be
held, business owners probably will institute the most economical and effica-
cious protective measures. Yet until the court further defines the standard to
be met, there is a risk that in some cases, the burden of the duty will outweigh
the potential benefit.92
ROBERT CHARLES PORT
89. See, e.g., Holland v. Malpass, 255 N.C. 395, 121 S.E.2d 576 (1961) (high rate of speed of
defendant's car was not the cause of a collision that could not have been avoided even if defend-
ant was driving at proper rate of speed); Lane v. Eastern Carolina Drivers Ass'n, 253 N.C. 764,
117 S.E.2d 737 (1961) (lack of protective barrier at race track was not actual cause of plaintifi's
injury since barrier would have provided no protection when racecar left track at excessive speed).
See generally Byrd, Actual Causation in North Carolina Tort Law, 50 N.C.L. Rev. 261, 263-65
(1972).
90. The court has recognized that a business owner should not be "required to take precau-
tions for his invitees' safety such as will... destroy the attractiveness of his establishement."
Hendrick v. Tigniere, 267 N.C. 62, 67, 147 S.E.2d 550, 554 (1966). See also Aaser v. City of
Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 499, 144 S.E.2d 610, 614 (1965).
91. See, e.g., Natl Corm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Crimes of Violence-
A Staff Report 774-77 (1969); Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, No. 21 (Series A), Street Lighting Projects 93 (1979).
92. As this Note went to press, Foster was settled out of court after two days of trial. Tele-
phone conversation with Richard D. Ramsey, attorney for plaintiff (Mar. 24, 1982).
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